Status is often defined by the hierarchical position social actors occupy in a particular social system (Gould, 2002; , but most social actors participate in multiple social systems simultaneously. When social actors participate in different social systems, they may occupy unequal status positions in each social system, thus making status inconsistency a concern for status theory (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944; Hughes, 1945) . Status inconsistency shifts attention, accordingly, from how status affects social actors within a single social system (Podolny, 1993) to the consequences of simultaneously occupying unequal status positions in different social systems (Lenski, 1954) . Status inconsistency poses a problem for social actors because it creates ambiguity about their social identity, which raises questions about what to expect from them and how to evaluate them (Smith, 2013; Zhang, 2008) . Despite the importance of status for organizations , status inconsistency in organizations remains, with a few exceptions (Kang, 2010; Zhao & Zhou, 2011) , unexplored. The lack of organizational status-inconsistency research is particularly unfortunate when it comes to understanding the importance of status for multi-unit organizations. Multi-unit organizations are both very common and, by virtue of operating in different industries or markets simultaneously (Zuckerman, 1999) , particularly susceptible to status inconsistency, thus highlighting the importance of extending status inconsistency theory to multi-unit organizations.
Status inconsistency can have negative consequences for multi-unit organizations because occupying unequally ranked status positions in different industries or markets creates status ambiguity. We argue specifically that status inconsistency affects multi-unit organizations primarily by weakening the commonly observed positive effect of status on organizational performance (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Malter, 2014; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010) . Focusing on how status inconsistency weakens the effect of status on organizational performance, we emphasize the interaction between status and status inconsistency, rather than the main effect of status inconsistency. We identify two complementary mechanisms that account for the negative interaction between status, status inconsistency, and performance. By creating status ambiguity, status inconsistency makes status a less effective signal of perceived quality (Podolny, 1993 ) and a less effective tool for managing accountability pressures (Jensen, 2006) , both of which make status less useful for external audiences deciding with whom to form exchange relationships. Specifically, status inconsistency creates ambiguity about the status of the multi-unit organization, which, in turn, reduces the value of the status of the multi-unit organization and its units for each individual unit. We argue, moreover, that status ambiguity stemming from status inconsistency is particularly problematic for high-status organizations and high-status units that traditionally have benefitted most from their advantageous status position.
1
Our study makes several contributions to status research. We contribute directly to status inconsistency research by shifting focus from singleunit organizations being ranked unequally on different status dimensions to multi-unit organizations whose different units are ranked unequally on the same status dimensions. Focusing on multiunit organizations and how status inconsistency affects the positive association between status and performance contributes more broadly to status research, as well by identifying an important limitation to status theory. Specifically, a core claim in status theory is that status is most valuable when product quality is uncertain because it allows decision makers to shift attention from unobservable product quality to observable status positions (Podolny, 1994) . We add that even when status positions are observable, status inconsistency can create uncertainty about how to interpret and assign meaning to inconsistent status positions. Status inconsistency, in other words, allows the problem of uncertainty about product quality to reappear in the form of uncertainty about status position. One previously unexplored implication for multi-unit organizations is clear: "A potentially important condition for successfully occupying multiple positions is that the multiple positions across different horizontal categories are within the same vertical status" (Jensen et al., 2011: 100) . Our study begins to address this important aspect by theorizing and empirically testing how and when status inconsistency affects multi-unit organizations.
We also contribute to status theory by focusing on how involuntary associations affect status beliefs. Social-networks-based research on status has focused mostly on voluntary relationships, such as underwriting syndicates (Cowen, 2012; Jensen, 2008; Podolny, 1993; Shipilov, Li, & Greve, 2011) , strategic alliances (Ahuja, Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009; Gulati & Garguilo, 1999; Ozmel, Reuer, & Gulati, 2013) , venture capital financing (Hsu, 2004; Petkova, Rindova, & Gupta, 2013; Pollock, Lee, Jin, & Lashley, 2015) , and accounting firm certification (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Jensen & Roy, 2008) . Voluntary relationships provide the structural foundation of status hierarchies (Podolny, 1994) and affect how external audiences view a particular social actor (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) . We add that even though involuntary associations may not imply as strong a form of interorganizational endorsements as voluntary associations, they still have the potential to affect the status beliefs of external audiences. By extending status theory to involuntary associations, our study not only opens up for applying status consideration to hitherto unexplored research areas, such as status inconsistency as a source of vertical diversification discount (Villalonga, 2004; Zuckerman, 2000) , but also emphasizes the importance of acknowledging that even involuntary association never intended to have status consequences may nevertheless create status ambiguity among external audiences.
We study the effect of status inconsistency on the performance of multi-unit organizations in a sample of 109 U.S. and non-U.S. business schools and their accounting, finance, management, marketing, and operations departments from 2002 to 2013. Most business schools are multi-unit organizations in which teaching and research activities are organized into separate academic departments 1 Status ambiguity is different from status noise or vagueness. Status ambiguity refers to situations in which the status of a multi-unit organization cannot be definitely resolved but specific and distinct interpretations are possible, whereas status noise or vagueness precludes specific and distinct interpretations. For example, a multi-unit organization with a high-and a low-status unit could, depending on the context, be equally meaningfully interpreted as a high-or a low-status multi-unit organization, whereas a multi-unit organization whose units operate in markets with poorly defined status hierarchies could not be given a specific and distinct interpretation. We focus on how status ambiguity induced by status inconsistency weakens the effect of status, rather than the effect of status inconsistency itself, because status inconsistency, compared to status, is a second-order concern for external audiences. (D'Aveni, 1996; Trieschmann, Dennis, Northcraft, & Nieme, 2000) . We define business school performance in terms of research performance not because teaching performance is unimportant, but because research performance, as indicated by publications in top academic journals, is more directly comparable across business schools. Moreover, because we focus on academic status, as indicated by the centrality of business schools and departments in PhD exchange networks (Bothner, Smith, & White, 2010; Burris, 2004) , research performance is a particularly relevant performance measure. We begin our theory development by defining status inconsistency and theorizing why status inconsistency in general weakens the positive association between status and organizational performance. To ground our hypothesis development in the business school context, we next discuss why status is important for publication in top academic journals and why status inconsistency weakens the association between status and research performance. We conclude our study with a discussion of its contributions to status theory and research, as well as its managerial relevance.
STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Status inconsistency refers to the extent to which social actors occupy unequally ranked status positions accorded different amounts of prestige in different social systems. Most research on status inconsistency focuses on single-unit social actors that participate in social systems that are stratified around different status dimensions.
2 An individual occupying unequally ranked educational and occupational status positions (e.g., a PhD employed in a coffee shop) and a single-product organization occupying unequally ranked status positions in different markets (e.g., a film studio that is acclaimed by film critics but unknown to regular audiences) are examples of status-inconsistent single-unit social actors. Following Lenski (1954 Lenski ( , 1956 ), most status inconsistency research has focused on individuals and how status inconsistency in, for example, income, occupation, and education status hierarchies affects mental stress, social isolation, and political attitudes (see Stryker & Macke, 1978; Whitt, 1983; Zhang, 2008) . More recently, some research has examined the consequences of status inconsistency for organizations and products that have acquired multiple status indicators. Kang (2010) found that U.S. venture capital firms with different achievement status (own achieved status) and reference status (peer comparison status) tend to deviate from modal investment strategies. In addition, Zhao and Zhou (2011) showed that differences between wine critics and wine appellations in the evaluation of Californian premium wines undermine the status claims of statusinconsistent wineries.
A different form of status inconsistency exists when the units in a multi-unit social actor are ranked unequally on the same status dimensions by external audiences in their own social systems. A corporation with multiple product divisions and a university with multiple colleges, each of which are ranked unequally in terms of perceived product and research quality, are examples of statusinconsistent multi-unit organizations. A vast amount of research has examined how horizontal diversification into different product categories affects the performance of firms (see Benito-Osorio, GuerrasMartín, & Zuñiga-Vicente, 2012) , and how bridging different horizontal product categories affects the performance of individual products (Hsu, 2006; Jensen, 2010; Smith, 2011) . Despite the widespread interest in horizontal product diversification and product category combinations, the consequences of occupying unequally ranked status positions in different product categories for horizontally diversified organizations remain largely unexplored. As noted above, however, successful participation in different horizontal product categories might require that organizations occupy equally ranked status positions in all the product categories . We shift attention accordingly from status-inconsistent single-unit organizations to status-inconsistent multi-unit organizations to examine how status inconsistency affects the performance of each of the individual units in a multi-unit organization.
Status inconsistency in multi-unit organizations can occur for different reasons. First, status inconsistency occurs when single-or multi-unit organizations add new units by diversifying into new industries in which they come to occupy status positions that are different from the positions they hold in their current industries. Commercial banks entering investment banking (Jensen, 2003) and accounting firms entering management consulting (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) are examples of diversification that could result in status inconsistency. Second, status inconsistency emerges gradually in multi-unit organizations when the status of their units changes at different rates because each unit makes different investments in statusconferring activities. When the different business units in a corporation invest unequally in product quality, for example, or when the academic departments in a college invest unequally in researchproductive faculty, status inconsistency emerges more gradually. Finally, status inconsistency can happen abruptly in a multi-unit organization if one of its units experiences a sudden increase or decrease in status due to positive or negative external evaluations. If an academic department jumps in status because one of its faculty wins a Nobel Prize, for example, or if a business unit is forced to recall a product due to real or perceived quality problems (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006) , status inconsistency happens more abruptly.
Regardless of the origin of status inconsistency, it poses a potential problem for multi-unit organizations because status provides a social identity that codifies what to expect from the occupants of that status position . When multiunit organizations occupy inconsistent status positions, their social identities are more difficult to ascertain by external audiences. Identity ambiguity is a problem in horizontal diversification. When firms diversify into different industries, for example, they make evaluations difficult for security analysts, which decreases analyst coverage and, therefore, the firms' stock market price (Zuckerman, 1999) . Similar problems may occur when multiunit organizations occupy different status positions in different markets. A firm may leverage its status in one market to build status in another (Jensen, 2003) , but persistent status inconsistency across business units creates status ambiguity. We argue next that the consequences of status inconsistency for multi-unit organizations and, more importantly, their individual units are likely negative, in particular for high-status organizations and high-status units, because status ambiguity decreases the effectiveness of status as a signal of perceived quality and the effectiveness of status in reducing accountability pressures.
STATUS INCONSISTENCY IN BUSINESS SCHOOLS
Business schools are complex multi-unit organizations that serve a variety of audiences with different products, such as student education, academic research, and business consulting, each of which may cause a particular business school to be ranked differently compared to others (D'Aveni, 1996) . Most business schools are comprised of different academic departments, such as accounting, finance, management, marketing, and operations, each of which may also be ranked unequally by its respective audience. Trieschmann et al. (2000) showed, for example, that different business schools not only rank differently in education (MBA programs) and research (scholarly publications), but also that the different academic departments within a particular business school often rank differently in research. A business school may therefore experience status inconsistency both because it ranks unequally on different status dimensions (education and research) and because its departments rank unequally on the same status dimension (research). We focus on the latter form of status inconsistency and how status inconsistency among academic departments within a business school affects their research performance. To theorize why status inconsistency may affect research performance, it is necessary to first understand why department and business school status are important for research performance.
Status and Research Performance
Department status and business school status are important for research performance because recognition and resources accrue disproportionally at the top of the status hierarchies. Merton (1968: 58) noted that academic recognition is shaped by the Matthew effect: "the accruing of greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark." The Matthew effect is self-perpetuating: high-status academics get more recognition for their research, which increases their access to resources that can be invested in new research, which gives them even more recognition and resources (Bedeian, Cavazos, Hunt, & Jauch, 2010; Burris, 2004; D'Aveni, 1996) . Because the Matthew effect is rooted in the uncertainty associated with evaluating research quality for external audiences (Pfeffer, 1993; Starbuck, 2009; Welch, 2014) , we focus on how status affects external evaluations of research quality, rather than internal resource allocations.
3 Specifically, we examine the implications of external evaluators, such as editors and reviewers, that focus on evaluating the quality of research, but may also be affected by social status in their evaluations.
By functioning as a signal of perceived quality (Jensen, 2003; Podolny, 1993; Stuart et al., 1999) , status provides unique information for editors and reviewers. To understand why status is an effective signal of perceived research quality, it is useful to decompose research quality. Ellison (2002) argued that academic papers vary on two different dimensions, q and r, that reflect the importance of their difficult-to-revise main contribution (q) and the easier-to-revise other aspects of quality, including theoretical framing, literature review, and empirical analyses (r). Status is positively correlated with both aspects of quality. Although important research (q-quality) happens in many different places, highstatus business schools and high-status departments are typically able to recruit the faculty behind important research from low-status schools and departments because they have greater access to resources, including financial and human capital, that can be used to revise (r-quality) manuscripts successfully. The status of a business school and a department cannot, however, be reduced to their financial and human capital because status tends to be robust to changes in financial and human capital, at least in the short term. Moreover, status cannot be appropriated by individual faculty members but is available to everybody in the business school, thus signaling quality for everybody affiliated with the business school and department, regardless of their own human and financial capital.
Status not only functions as a signal of perceived quality, but also reduces accountability pressures (Jensen, 2006) . Accountability refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that social actors can be called on at any time to explain and justify their decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Scott & Lyman, 1968) . Editors are accountable for the academic integrity and the status of their journals, as commonly indicated by citation impact, inclusion in external quality surveys, and centrality in cocitation networks (Baum, 2011; Önder & Terviö, 2015; Trieschmann et al., 2000) . Status reduces accountability pressures because it is easier to defend having mistakenly accepted a low-quality manuscript from a high-status than a low-status institution, and having mistakenly rejected a high-quality manuscript from a low-status than a high-status institution. Because low-quality research by high-status scientists diffuses faster than low-quality research by low-status scientists (Cole, 1970; Judge, Cable, Colbert, & Rynes, 2007) , mistakenly accepting research from high-status institutions is less of an issue for editors who are worried about journal citations than are similar mistakes with low-status institutions. It is, in other words, more easily justifiable for editors to give, knowingly or unknowingly, the benefit of the doubt to faculty from high-status business schools and departments than to faculty from low-status business schools and departments. 4 In sum, status is important for research performance because status functions as a signal of perceived quality, thus helping editors make the right editorial decisions, and because it reduces accountability pressures, thus helping editors avoid being blamed for the wrong editorial decisions. Because business school status and department status both function as signals of perceived research quality and reduce accountability pressures, we expect positive associations between business school status and department research performance and between department status and department research performance. We argue next that status inconsistency weakens the positive associations between business school status, department status, and department performance by decreasing the effectiveness of status as a signal of perceived quality and the effectiveness of status in reducing accountability pressures.
Status Inconsistency and Research Performance
The effectiveness of a market signal depends on the correlation between the observable signal and unobservable quality (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011) . Status inconsistency differently reduces the correlation between the observable status signal and unobservable quality for highand low-status departments in a business school. Status inconsistency likely results in status deflation at the top of the hierarchy because it implies negative status transfers to low-status departments (Podolny, 1994) , thus reducing the benefits of status for high-status departments. Status inconsistency likely results in status inflation at the bottom of the hierarchy, on the other hand, because it implies positive status transfers from high-status departments, thus increasing the benefits of status for low-status departments. Alternatively, status inconsistency could simultaneously create status deflation at the top of the status hierarchy and status inflation at the bottom, thus diminishing the perceived differences between high-and low-status departments. Whether status inconsistency results in status deflation or status inflation, the aggregate result, although not necessarily the result for all departments, as argued below, is to weaken the positive association between status and performance. Status inconsistency, in other words, creates doubt about the status of a business school through status ambiguity and, as a consequence, the status of its individual departments through status inflation and deflation, which makes business school status and department status less useful signals of perceived quality.
The effectiveness of status as a mechanism to reduce accountability depends on the extent to which status identifies a clearly defined set of expectations on which to base external evaluations . By creating status ambiguity, status inconsistency makes it difficult to evaluate research and to justify these evaluations, which forces editors and reviewers to be more critical and form complex and integrated views that are easier to defend (Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) . Specifically, status inconsistency makes it easier for external audiences and the editors themselves to question status-based justifications of editorial decisions. For high-status departments, status inconsistency makes it harder justify "accept mistakes" by invoking department status: status inconsistency should have deflated department status. For low-status departments, status inconsistent makes it harder to justify "reject mistakes" by invoking department status: status inconsistency should have inflated department status. As a result, status inconsistency diminishes the perceived differences between high-and low-status departments, which makes status a less effective mechanism for external evaluators to reduce accountability pressures. Putting the arguments together, status inconsistency creates reasonable doubt about the actual status of a business school and its different departments, as discussed above, thus ensuring ex ante uncertainty about expected quality (signaling problem) and ex post uncertainty about decision justifiability (accountability problem).
The status inconsistency argument suggests, in other words, that status inconsistency weakens the positive association between status and research performance because it weakens the effectiveness of status as a signal of perceived quality and the effectiveness of status in reducing accountability pressures. We therefore hypothesize that: Hypothesis 1. Status inconsistency diminishes the positive associations between (a) department status and department research performance and (b) business school status and department research performance.
The effects of status inconsistency may not be the same for high-and low-status business schools. The advantages of status accrue disproportionally at the top of the status hierarchy (Blau, 1994; Sørensen, 1996) , which implies that status is less important at the bottom of the hierarchy. Because low-status actors tend to benefit little from status hierarchy, they have less to lose from deviating from status-based norms and expectations (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001 ). High-status actors, on the other hand, may deviate in identity-confirming ways, such as encouraging unconventional research, but not in an identity-threatening way (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001 ). The implication is not that high-status organizations always avoid identity-threatening affiliations with low-status organizations. High-status organizations may indeed value low-status affiliations if they can extract more resources from lowstatus organizations in their exchange relationships (Castellucci & Ertug, 2010; Cowen, 2012) . The value for high-status organizations of extracting more resources through low-status affiliations depends, however, on the affiliations being voluntary, with independent organizations that bring external resources to the high-status organizations. When the affiliations are involuntary affiliations within a multi-unit organization, the resource extraction advantages of low-status affiliations are less relevant. However, the status threat to the high-status multiunit organizations and their high-status units still applies because it reduces their ability to extract external resources.
In addition, status differences tend to diminish and become less salient at the bottom of the status hierarchy, which makes status a less useful mechanism to distinguish among low-status business schools. Being in the first decile of a ranking is typically seen as something very different from being in the third decile, for example, whereas being in the seventh decile is hardly distinguishable from being in the ninth decile. The differences between the deciles of business schools and departments at the top of the status hierarchy are simply more meaningful than the differences at the bottom of the hierarchy. Because status itself is more ambiguous at the bottom of the hierarchy, status inconsistency at the bottom of the hierarchy is less consequential than at the top of the hierarchy. Status inconsistency is, in other words, more likely to pose a problem for highstatus than low-status business schools. We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2. Status inconsistency is more likely to diminish the positive associations between (a) department status and department research performance and (b) business school status and department research performance for high-status business schools than for low-status business schools.
The effects of status inconsistency for high-and low-status departments are more complex. For highstatus departments, being in a status-inconsistent business school implies the co-location of one or more low-status departments, which may pose a problem for the high-status departments because their status may be deflated by the low-status departments. The mere association with low-status departments, even involuntary associations, increases the risk of status deflation because external audiences tend to attribute meaning to simple spatial co-locations (Campbell, 1958; . Specifically, low-status departments may taint the high-status departments in the eyes of external audiences, which may result in the external audiences effectively deflating the status of high-status departments in statusinconsistent business schools. Status inconsistency reduces, in other words, the value of status for high-status departments because even involuntary associations with low-status departments can create ambiguity about the actual status of the high-status departments. For high-status departments, being in status-consistent business schools implies the colocation of one or more other high-status departments, thus avoiding the risk of status deflation and reducing status ambiguity. In addition, when the status of the business school and the status of its departments are unambiguously high, the effectiveness of status in signaling perceived quality and reducing accountability pressures is likely strengthened (Zhao & Zhou, 2011) .
For low-status departments, being in statusinconsistent business schools implies the colocation of one or more high-status departments. Unlike high-status departments, low-status departments benefit from status leakage to the extent that being co-located with high-status departments is viewed as an implicit endorsement of the lowstatus departments by the high-status departments (Stuart et al., 1999) . Being co-located with highstatus departments may, however, result in status disappointment if the audiences identify the lowstatus departments with their co-located highstatus departments and inflate their expectations to the low-status departments too much. The value of high-status departments as endorsements depends ultimately on the low-status departments being able to actually meet the expectations of high-status departments, which is more likely when the high-status departments associate voluntarily with low-status departments after having carefully evaluated the low-status departments (Stuart et al., 1999) . For low-status departments, being in status-consistent business schools implies the co-location of one or more other low-status departments. When the status of the business school and the status of its departments are unambiguously low, it is difficult to further weaken their effectiveness in signaling perceived quality and reducing accountability pressures, thus making status considerations generally less relevant.
In sum, because both status inflation and status disappointment affect low-status units, even if one dominates in a particular context, status inconsistency is less likely to reduce the benefits of business school and department status for low-status departments than for high-status departments. 5 We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3. Status inconsistency is more likely to diminish the positive associations between (a) department status and department research performance and (b) business school status and department research performance for high-status departments than for low-status departments.
Finally, status inconsistency is likely to weaken the positive association between business school status and research performance more than it weakens the positive association between department status and research performance. Department status is a more proximate signal of quality and accountability than business school status, which makes department status less susceptible to status inconsistency than business school status. Proximity refers to the extent to which audiences are part of a status-stratified social system and therefore know who occupies what status position. Specifically, most academic journals specialize by academic field and most editors and reviewers are experienced scholars that know the status hierarchies of their own fields. Even if status inconsistency creates ambiguity about the status of a business school, status inconsistency is less likely to affect how editors and reviewers view departments in their own fields because they have more detailed knowledge about the status hierarchies in their own fields. By distinguishing between the effects of status inconsistency on department status and business school status, we argue implicitly that editors and reviewers do not know and consider the status of all the departments in a business school equally well. We also narrow the scope of our status inconsistency argument by arguing that status inconsistency across departments affects proximate department status considerations less when external evaluators are embedded in the same status hierarchies as the focal department.
In sum, because status inconsistency is more likely to create ambiguity about business school status than about department status, it is more likely to diminish the positive association between business school status and research performance than the positive association between department status and research performance. We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4. Status inconsistency is more likely to diminish the positive association between business school status and department research performance than the positive association between department status and department research performance.
METHODS

Business School Sample
The business school is a relatively young academic institution. The first business school, Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Paris, was founded in 1819; the first U.S. business school, The Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, in 1881; and Harvard Business School offered the first Master of Business Administration degree in 1908. Business schools serve two purposes, teaching and research, whose relative importance has changed over time (Khurana & Spender, 2012; Simon, 1967) . Whereas business schools initially focused primarily on teaching and hardly paid attention to research, midcentury criticism of business school research for poor quality led to an increased emphasis on research (Kaplan, 2014; Khurana, 2007) . The leading U.S. business schools responded aggressively to raise their academic status and shed the negative trade-school image by requiring doctoral degrees for tenured faculty appointments, rewarding publications in peer-reviewed academic journals, and favoring quantitative discipline-based research methods. To facilitate the transition to research-active institutions, most business schools organized themselves as independent schools or colleges and adopted a functional organizational structure with a dean overseeing specialized academic departments such as accounting, finance, management, marketing, and operations in charge of teaching and research.
The business school has been a success: more than 14,000 business schools enrolled thousands of students in undergraduate, graduate, and executive degree programs in 2014. We use a sample of 109 research-active business schools drawn from the University of Texas-Dallas (UTD) 2013 lists (the Top 100 North American Rankings and the Top 100 Worldwide Rankings). We focus on research-active business schools because the majority of the 14,000 business schools are not involved in significant research activities but emphasize teaching only. To ensure comparability of business schools, our sample is comprised mainly of U.S. business schools (86) and non-U.S. business schools from Canada (9), Europe (4), and Asia and Australia (9) that have adopted the U.S. business school model and publish in the top peer-reviewed management journals (data availability, particularly in the Internet webpage archive used to create the PhD exchange networks, eliminated some business schools on the UTD lists from our sample). We follow the 109 business schools and their accounting, finance, management, marketing, and operation departments from 2002 to 2013. 6 Because business schools use different names for their academic departments and sometimes group them differently, we combined organizational behavior, strategy, human resource management, entrepreneurship, and international business into management, and management science, supply chain, logistics, and information science into operations. Appendix A lists the business schools in our sample.
Dependent Variable
We define research performance in terms of academic journal publications, and use the UTD research contribution score to measure journal publications. The annual UTD research contribution score counts and prorates, depending on the number of coauthors, the number of articles published in 24 leading academic business journals. 7 To measure department research performance in an efficient manner, we assigned the journals to individual departments; for example, The Accounting Review, the Journal of Accounting and Economics, and the Journal of Accounting Review were assigned to the accounting department (the journals, the UTD prorating method, and the journal assignments are provided in Appendix B). This assignment approach could cause problems because some journals could be assigned to more than one department since faculty from more departments publish regularly in these journals, such as operations and management faculty publishing in Management Science, and some faculty could be in one department but publish in journals assigned to other departments. To make sure our results were not affected by ambiguous journal assignments, we switched journal assignments and removed the most ambiguous journal (Management Science), finding that the results are robust. We also hand-coded a subsample of five top-20 schools over three different years to match each individual faculty to publications and departments, and found a reassuring 0.88 correlation between the direct measure and the assigned measure of department performance.
The UTD research contributions ranking uses a more comprehensive list of journals than the lists used in other research on business school research performance (e.g., Trieschmann et al., 2000) but it nevertheless ignores publications in lesser business journals and publications in discipline-based journals. By ignoring lesser business journals, the research performance of lower-status business schools is likely underestimated because faculty in these schools tend to publish disproportionally more in business journals that are unlikely to count in promotion and compensation decisions in higher-status business schools. By ignoring discipline-based journals, however, the research performance of higher-status business schools is likely to be underestimated because faculty in these schools tend to publish disproportionally more in discipline-based journals, such as psychology, sociology, and economics journals. Because our approach underestimates the research performance of both high-and low-status departments, we find it unlikely the limited number of journals used by UTD favors either high-or low-status departments.
8 By focusing on department-level research performance, rather than individual-level research performance, our approach is also unlikely to portray a highly productive department as unproductive because department performance depends on the performance of all the faculties in a department, even if the performance of a few individual faculty members focusing exclusively on disciplinary journals may be misrepresented. 
Independent Variables
Status. The status of a business school refers to its rank among other business schools. Focusing on research performance, the relevant ranking of business 6 We excluded economics departments because the majority of business schools in our sample do not have economics departments and most business schools with economics departments have larger and academically stronger economics departments outside the business school, including Stanford, MIT, and Chicago.
7 UTD prorates the number of publications by the number of coauthors to avoid double-counting publications in departments and business schools with more collaborative research and publication strategies. The results are robust to not prorating and using the total number of publications. We use the annual prorated number of publications but our results are robust to using a three-year moving average. 8 Although it is unlikely that our results are substantively affected by the exclusion of disciplinary and lower-tier business journals, it is prudent to note this limitation of the UTD data. 9 We focus on departments rather than individuals both because of our theoretical interest in multi-unit organizations and because academic departments should ideally be status inconsistent, comprised of individuals at different stages of their careers, such as assistant professors, associate professors, and full professors, which makes department-level status inconsistency less of a concern than business-school-level status inconsistency. schools for our study is based on the academic accomplishments of the faculty and doctoral students at the business schools. The academic status of a business school and its departments can be captured by the exchange (hiring and placement) of PhD students: the exchange of PhDs is "a symbolic act of mutual affirmation" that confirms and reproduces status divisions (Burris, 2004: 244) . Burris (2004) showed that centrality in the PhD exchange network explained 84% of the variance in expert surveys of departmental prestige in sociology (similarly in history and political science) and Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore (2015) showed that it is a better predictor of PhD placements than a U.S. News & World Report rank in computer science, business, and history (see Amir and Knauff [2008] for economics). Following Burris (2004) and Bothner et al. (2010) , we create annual symmetric 109 3 109 PhD exchange matrices to calculate business school status, in which cells denote the total number of PhDs exchanged between business schools i and j calculated by adding the number of PhDs hired by business school i from business school j to the number hired by business school j from business school i. We use same approach to calculate department status, except that we now use the department networks in which cells ij include the number of PhDs exchanged between department z in school i and department z in school j. To avoid random year-to-year fluctuations, we use fiveyear rolling hiring and placement data to create our PhD exchange matrices: status in 2012 depends, in other words, on the hiring and placement of PhDs between 2008 and 2012.
Following prior status research (Jensen, 2003; Podolny, 1993) , we measure status using the standard network centrality measure (Bonacich, 1987) , according to which the status of a business school (academic department) depends on the status of the schools (departments) with which it exchanges PhD students:
where a is a scaling factor that normalizes the measure, b is a weighting factor (we follow Benjamin and Podolny [1999] and set b at 0.995 of the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of R; see also Bonacich and Rodan [2011] on choosing the b parameter) that reflects how much the status of the focal school depends on the status of the schools with which it exchange PhD students, R is the 109 3 109 PhD exchange matrix, and I is a column vector of ones. 11 The 2012 status ranking of the 109 sampled business schools is shown in Appendix A.
Status inconsistency. The status inconsistency of a business school refers to the extent to which the status of the accounting, finance, management, marketing, and operations departments differ. We follow Lenski (1954) and measure status inconsistency as:
where S i is the status of department i and M is the average status of the different departments within a business school. Status inconsistency research faces the problem of separating the main effect of status from the effect of status inconsistency, a problem that is particularly severe in research focusing on single-unit actors being ranked on different status dimensions where the status of the actor is defined as the average of its status on each of the different dimensions (Jackson & Curtis, 1972; Treiman, 1966; Zhang, 2008) . By focusing on multidepartment business schools, we partly avoid this problem because department status and status inconsistency are defined at two different measurement levels (department and business school), which ensures that status inconsistency is not a linear function of department status. Figure 1 illustrates our status measures (business school status, department status, and status inconsistency) for the top-10 business schools in 2012. The solid black line shows the business school status, the dashed gray line status inconsistency, and the stacked columns department status, calculated as described above. Figure 1 shows, for example, that Harvard Business School and University of Chicago have relatively high status inconsistency due to the dominance of their management and finance 10 Bonacich (1987 10 Bonacich ( : 1172 10 Bonacich ( -1173 ) noted that the s(a, b) measure is appropriate for symmetric and asymmetric relations but that s(a, b), according to the distinction between centrality and prestige in Knoke and Burt (1983) , technically measures prestige if the relations are asymmetric and centrality if they are symmetric. We follow Burris (2004) and use symmetric PhD exchange networks because, like Burris (2004: 252) , we have no theoretical reasons to assign different weights to placing and hiring PhDs. To ensure that our results are robust, we follow Bothner et al. (2010: 976) and recalculate our status measure using the simpler eigenvector centrality measure (Bonacich, 1972) . We also recalculate our status measure using the s(a, b) measure on asymmetric PhD networks and present all the results in our robustness checks. departments, whereas Stanford and Wharton have relatively low status inconsistency.
Control Variables
We use a number of different control variables to rule out alternative explanations for the relationship between status, status inconsistency, and research performance. We control for prior research performance by including a one-year lagged dependent variable (Prior Research Performance) because prior research performance is a strong predictor of both status and future research performance and including a lagged dependent variable is a common way of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman & Borjas, 1980; Podolny, 1994) . 12 We control for department size by including the annual number of faculty in each department (Department Size). Department size affects both the number of articles published and department status because high-status departments tend to be favored when opportunities to hire new faculty are allocated within business schools. Specifically, research has shown that the power of a department within a university is highly correlated with national prestige, and that the power of a department increases the amount of resources allocated to that department (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974) . 13 We use a series of binary variables to control for different qualitative aspects of a business school that may both be related to status and research performance, including the lack of a PhD program (No PhD Program), whether the business school is part of an elite university (Elite University) or a public university (Public University), and whether the business school is named after a donor (Donor Name).
14 Controlling for PhD program is important because having a PhD program is an indication that a business school is highly committed to research and views the academic research community as an importance stakeholder (as opposed to only corporate recruiters of graduate and undergraduate students). Moreover, business schools without PhD programs participate only partly in the status-granting PhD exchanges by virtue of hiring, but not placing, PhD students. The size of the PhD program, as measured by the number of PhDs placed, provides an alternative indicator of status due to the skewed distribution of faculty production, with the top 25% of schools producing almost 75% of faculty (see Clauset, Arbesman, & Larremore, 2015) . The size of the PhD program is correlated with department size and research performance, however, thus suggesting that we report, as a robustness check, the full model with the presence of a PhD program substituted for the size of the PhD program.
We control for the age of the business school (Business School Age), as well as for department (accounting as comparison group) and country (United States as comparison group). Some of the research performance observations (the dependent variable) were missing, typically because of zero publications in the relevant journals, which led us to set the missing variables to zero and enter controls for missing research performance and missing prior research performance (Missing Research Performance; Missing Prior Research Performance).
15 All the models include fixed effects for year (not reported). Table 1 contains summary statistics and bivariate correlations.
Multicollinearity and Endogeneity
Multicollinearity and endogeneity are common concerns in nonexperimental research that could inflate standard errors and bias coefficient estimates. Multicollinearity could be a concern in our study because department status, business school status, and status inconsistency are ultimately based on the same PhD exchange networks, and are therefore (Kacperczyk, 2013; Useem & Karabel, 1986) . 15 Unnecessary controls may lead to estimate bias (Atinc, Simmering, & Kroll, 2012) . Thus, in one of our robustness checks, we removed the two dummy variables for missing performance. The results were highly consistent. relatively highly correlated. Endogeneity is almost always a problem in status research because unobserved quality differences could account for both status and research performance differences (Azoulay, Stuart, & Wang, 2014; Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1994) .
We address the multicollinearity concern by reporting results using (1) mean-centered status variables (Aiken & West, 1991; Guler & Guillén, 2010) , (2) orthogonalized main effects, and (3) orthogonalized main and interaction effects. First, mean-centering can facilitate the interpretation of coefficients on lower-order terms in the presence of interactions, while results regarding interaction effects remain unchanged (Aguinis, Edwards, & Bradley, 2016) . Second, following Ertug and Castellucci (2013) , Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert (2009), and Rindova (2003) , we orthogonalize our status variables using the orthog command in Stata 12 because of the high correlation between these variables. By orthogonalizing first prior performance, department status, business school status, and status inconsistency, and then also the interactions between department status, business school status, and status inconsistency, we remove the effect of prior performance from the status measures, the effect of department status on business school status, the effects of department status and business school status on status inconsistency, and the effects of the three main effects on the interaction effects. 16 Although the magnitudes of the orthogonalized variables are hard to interpret Notes: Coefficients greater than .04 in absolute value are significant at p , .01. 16 We orthogonalize department-level variables first for the following reasons. First, our unit of analysis is department and we measure performance accordingly at the department level. Second, we expect department status to have the strongest effect on department performance. Third, editors are closer to the department unit of analysis than to the business school unit of analysis. Fourth, our status measure is rooted in departments because hiring decisions are department-level decisions, which means that departmentlevel networks aggregate to business-school-level networks, but not the other way around. Finally, if we orthogonalize school status before department status, the variance "shared" between the school and the departments would be "allocated" to the school. Because business schools resemble their high-status departments more than their low-status departments (as shown in regression analyses, including business-school-level regressions not reported here), the variance "left" for the departments will be the variance unique to the low-status departments. Switching the orthogonalization order should therefore switch the expected sign of the department status 3 school status inconsistency interaction from negative to positive, which is similar to lowstatus departments in Model 18. Unreported reestimated orthogonalized models with business school status orthogonalized before department status show that key interactions indeed switch sign, thus confirming our approach to orthogonalize department status before business school status. (Cohen & Cohen, 1983 ) because of the way in which orthogonalization transforms the original data, the uncertainty about the direction and statistical significance of the highly correlated variables is removed (Pollock & Rindova, 2003) .
To address the endogeneity concern, it would be ideal to use a randomized experiment by assigning the same papers to departments and business schools with different levels of status and status inconsistency to see whether this affects how editors evaluate papers. Unfortunately, it is not possible to conduct randomized experiments in our context, nor can we take advantage of idiosyncratic natural experiments, such as randomly missing author names previously used to identify status effects (Simcoe & Waguespack, 2011) . We rely instead on a comprehensive set of control variables, including prior research performance, department size, and presence or size of PhD program, as discussed above, to reduce the likelihood that unobserved quality differences bias our results. Moreover, we include prior research performance, the most direct measure of research quality, in the set of hierarchically orthogonalized variables as the base variable, which means that the common variance of prior research performance, department status, business school status, and status inconsistency is removed before regressing research performance on these variables. To the extent that research (or faculty) quality is the common unobserved factor behind the effects of prior research performance and status on future research performance, orthogonalization effectively removes this common unobserved factor, thus alleviating the endogeneity concern ( Denis & Sarin, 1999) .
Statistical Analysis
We use a multi-level mixed-effects model to test our hypotheses because academic departments are nested within a business school and therefore are not independent of each other (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008) . Specifically, we define a three-level model with random intercepts at the business school and academic department levels and with country, department type, and year fixed effects (described above). The intraclass correlation tests (ICC) comparing the three-level models with one-level ordinary linear regression models are highly significant, which suggests that the three-level mixed-effects approach is appropriate. We reestimated the three-level models, treating business school and academic department as fixed effects, and found similar results. To compare the overall goodness of fit across models, we used the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which allow for the comparison of mixed models with different numbers of levels and predictors (Arregle, Miller, Hitt, & Beamish, 2013; Burnham & Anderson, 2004) . In general, a decrease in AIC and BIC of more than 10 indicates a substantial improvement; a decrease of more than 4 indicates a considerable improvement; and a decrease of less than 2 indicates no improvement in model fit (Burnham & Anderson, 2004: 270) . Table 2 presents the results of multi-level mixedeffects regression of departmental research performance. Models 1 to 5 contain mean-centered status variables; Model 6 and Model 7 contain orthogonalized main effects status variables; Model 8 contains orthogonalized main-and interaction effects status variables; Model 9 contains orthogonalized prior research performance variable and the mainand interaction effects status variables.
RESULTS
Model 1 contains control variables only. It shows, as expected, that larger departments in elite universities with PhD programs that were more research productive in the past tend to also be more productive in the future. The control variables also show that academic departments differ in performance, with operation departments being the most and accounting departments the least productive, which is probably a reflection of differences in research practices, with departments relying more on modeling research designs (operations and marketing) publishing more papers (or differences in the journals covered by the UTD ranking system). There are no performance differences between U.S. and other schools, which is not a surprise because only highly research active non-U.S. schools are included in the sample. Finally, the controls for missing research performance observations shows that missing research performance is associated with lower research performance but missing prior research performance with higher performance, which probably reflects simple mean reversion.
Model 2 includes the status variables. The effects of department status and business school status are consistently positive and significant, thus showing that status is positively associated with department-level research performance. The support for Hypothesis 1a, which suggested that status inconsistency is associated with a weakened effect of department status, is mixed in the unorthogonalized models. The departmentstatus-by-status-inconsistency interaction variable is negative, as suggested in Hypothesis 1a, but only The department-status-by-status-inconsistency interaction variable is, however, negative and statistically significant in all the orthogonalized models (6-9), thus providing more consistent support for Hypothesis 1a when multicollinearity is removed. Model 4 includes the interaction between business school status and status inconsistency and provides strong support for Hypothesis 1b. The business-school-status-by-statusinconsistency interaction variable is negative and significant (-0.02; p , 0.001), thus suggesting that status inconsistency diminishes the positive association between business school status and department research performance. The support for Hypothesis 1b is confirmed in the full Model 5 and all the orthogonalized models. The decreases in AIC and BIC show that model fitness is also significantly improved. Following Paolella and Durand (2016) , we graph Hypothesis 1b and 1b in Figure 2 based on the fully orthogonalized Model 9 in Table 2 . Figure 2A and Figure 2B show that the marginal effects of department status and school status on department performance decrease as business school status inconsistency increases, thus confirming a negative moderation effect of status inconsistency on both business school status and department status. Figure 2A also shows that the positive effect of department status becomes nonsignificant (p . 0.05) when status inconsistency approaches four, which is approximately four standard deviations above mean status inconsistency. In addition, Figure 2B shows that the positive effect of school status becomes nonsignificant (p . 0.05) when status inconsistency approaches two, which is approximately two standard deviations above mean status inconsistency. Finally, the negative effect of status inconsistency on the positive association between status and research performance is substantively significant as well. A one standard deviation increase in status inconsistency leads the effect of department status on research performance to decrease by 9% and a one standard deviation increase in status inconsistency would lead the effect of school status on research performance to decrease by almost 14%. 17 We split the full (orthogonalized) sample and analyze high-and low-status business schools and highand low-status departments separately in Table 3 . For comparison, Model 10 is identical to Model 9. Models 11 to 14 focus on the 50 highest-and 50 lowest-status business schools and show that status inconsistency weakens the positive effects of business school and department status on department research performance for high-status business schools but not for low-status business schools. Hypothesis 2, which suggested that status inconsistency is more likely to diminish the positive associations between (a) department status and department research performance and (b) business school status and department research performance for high-status schools than for low-status schools, is therefore supported. Models 15 to 18 focus on the 50 highestand 50 lowest-status academic departments and show that status inconsistency decreases the positive effects of business school and department status on department research performance for high-status departments but increases the positive effects for low-status departments. Hypothesis 3, which suggested that status inconsistency is more likely to diminish the positive associations between (a) department status and department research performance and (b) business school status and department research performance for high-status departments than for low-status departments, is therefore supported.
Although not an explicit test of the theoretical mechanisms accounting for the status-inconsistency effects, the opposite status-inconsistency interaction effects for high-and low-status departments in Model 16 and Model 18 suggest that the status inconsistency interaction effects are more likely caused by status deflation for high-status departments and status inflation for low-status departments, as argued above, rather than resource concentration in high-status departments, which would have given the opposite results.
We graph Hypothesis 2 in Figure 3 based on Model 12 and Model 14. Figure 3A shows that the marginal effect of department status on department performance for high-status business schools decreases and becomes nonsignificant (p . 0.05) as status inconsistency increases above three (three standard deviations above the mean). A one standard deviation increase in status inconsistency leads the effect of department status on research performance to decrease by 11%. For low-status business schools, the marginal effects of department and business school status in Figure 3B and Figure 3D decrease as Figure 3C shows that the positive effect of business school status becomes nonsignificant (p . 0.05) as status inconsistency increases above two (two standard deviations above the mean). A one standard deviation increase in status inconsistency decreases the effect of school status on research performance by 15%. Finally, we graph Hypothesis 3 in Figure 4 based on Model 16 and Model 18. Figure 4A and Figure 4C show that the marginal effects of department status and business school status decrease as status inconsistency increases for high-status departments, with effect sizes being similar to those in Figure 3A and Figure 3C . Figures 4B and 4D statistically significant. We test the difference between b (department status by status inconsistency) / b (department status) and b (school status by status inconsistency) / b (school status) rather than the difference between b (department status by status inconsistency) and b (school status by status inconsistency) because the importance of the status-inconsistency interaction effects depends not only on the size of the interaction effects themselves, b (department status by status inconsistency) and b (school status by status inconsistency) , but also on the size of the main effects, b (department status) and b (department status) . The size of the main effects needs to be considered because a large interaction effect does not necessarily mean that the interaction effect is substantively important. If the main effect of business school status and department status is relatively large compared to the status inconsistency interaction effects, the status inconsistency interaction effects would hardly change the overall effect of business school and department status.
Specifically, we used the nlcom command in Stata 13 to test whether the main-effects-scaled interaction effects are significantly different from each other by testing whether (b (school status by status inconsistency) / b (school status) ) -(b (department status by status inconsistency) / b (department status) ) is different from zero. The significant Interaction Difference scores in Table 2 support Hypothesis 4: proportional to the main effects of business school status and department status, status inconsistency is likely to diminish the positive association between business schools status on department research performance significantly more than it diminishes the positive association between department status and department research performance. Finally, the significant Interaction Difference scores in Model 12 and Model 16 in Table 3 provide additional support for Hypothesis 4: status inconsistency is likely to diminish the positive association between business school status and department research performance significantly more than it diminishes the positive association between department status and department research performance for high-status business schools and high-status departments.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We argued in this study that status inconsistency in multi-unit organizations diminishes the positive association between status and performance because it weakens the effectiveness of status as a signal of perceived quality and as an accountabilityreduction mechanism. Using business schools and their accounting, finance, management, marketing, and operations departments as the empirical setting, we argued that the positive association between department-and school-level status and departmentlevel research performance depends on school-level status consistency. Our statistical analyses provide strong support for our core arguments. Department status and business school status are positively associated with department-and school-level research performance, but status inconsistency diminishes the positive associations between department status and school status and department (and school) research performance. Status inconsistency is particularly problematic at the top of the status hierarchy: Status inconsistency weakens the positive associations for high-status business schools and high-status departments, whereas it strengthens the positive associations for low-status departments. Finally, status inconsistency diminishes the positive association between business school status and research performance more than it diminishes the positive association between department status and research performance.
In addition to the specific contributions discussed in the introduction, our study contributes more broadly to status theory as well. By showing that status inconsistency weakens the positive association between status and performance, we identify an important constraint on self-perpetuating status advantages, thus providing a theoretical limit to the cumulative advantage of status. Other limits to the self-perpetuation of status advantages exist, such as, for example, status homophily, status discrimination, status deprivation, and status disruption, which increase the negative consequences of positive status shifts (Jensen, 2008; Jensen & Kim, 2015; Podolny, 1994) . Status inconsistency is particularly relevant for multi-unit organizations because it emphasizes the importance of coordinating statusinfluencing resource allocations among seemingly independent units within the same multi-unit organization. Specifically, although status simplifies external evaluations by functioning as a signal of product quality that reduces uncertainty about product quality (Jensen & Roy, 2008; Podolny, 1993) , status can also, as briefly discussed in the introduction, complicate external evaluations if status inconsistency creates ambiguity about the actual status of a multi-unit organization. Indeed, rethinking status inconsistency as vertical unrelatedness, our study suggests that status inconsistency should be integrated into product diversification theory to complement horizontal relatedness as a potential constraint on beneficial horizontal diversification (Markides, 1995; Zuckerman, 2000) .
Our study also has important managerial implications. The implications for business schools are straightforward. Whereas other research has documented the negative effects on department research performance of an intradepartmental low-productivity culture (Kim, Morse, & Zingales, 2009) , we document the negative effects of interdepartmental status inconsistency on research performance for high-status business schools. Status inconsistency in high-status business schools typically manifests in a particular form of status inequality where a few departments rank significantly lower than the other highly ranked departments. Rather than increasing the status of the high-status departments even more, which can be the consequence of winner-take-all incentive systems such as, for example, allocating extra 18 We conduct a series of robustness checks. We substitute the presence of PhD program for the size of PhD program; use the eigenvector centrality measure (Bonacich, 1972) for status instead of the s(a, b) measure (Bonacich, 1987) ; use the s(a, b) measure (Bonacich, 1987) on asymmetric PhD placement networks instead of symmetric PhD networks; reestimate Model 9 using U.S. schools only; exclude observations with zero publication; use the total (not-prorated) number of publications as dependent variable; and employ a three-year moving window for research performance. All the robustness checks support our main results. resources based on PhD student placements, our study suggests that allocating extra resources to lower-status departments to move them up the status hierarchy could increase the research performance of all the departments in the business school. We obviously do not suggest that resources necessary for high-status departments to remain competitive relative to high-status departments in other business schools within their markets should be reallocated to low-status departments; only that it might be more productive for everybody to use extra resources to increase the status of low-status departments. The importance of status consistency generalizes straightforwardly to other types of multi-unit organizations that depend on external audiences.
Our study is not without limitations. We do not fully explore the scope conditions of our theoretical arguments. Specifically, status inconsistency remains an issue as long as the units of a multi-unit organization and their audiences are not completely isolated from each other and have absolutely no knowledge about each other. The business school context meets this boundary condition because most editors are senior faculty in researchactive business schools that, over the years, have typically acquired detailed knowledge about the status hierarchies in their own fields, some knowledge about the status hierarchies in neighboring fields, and rudimentary knowledge about the status hierarchies in other fields through their work on tenure committees and other interdepartmental functions. 19 Status inconsistency is nevertheless more important in contexts in which the audiences for the different units are the same or pay closer attention to all the units. The stock market is a context with likely stronger status inconsistency effects, for example, because investors and analysts carefully attend to all the business units of public firms and their market (Zuckerman, 1999) . Our study provides, therefore, a conservative test of status inconsistency and its effects on the positive association between status and performance, but it would nevertheless be useful to empirically explore the scope conditions more comprehensively.
Finally, we cannot determine which one of the two theoretical mechanisms, signaling quality and accountability reduction, behind the status inconsistency effects matter most. We are, however, less concerned with our inability to determine the relative importance of the theoretical mechanisms because the primary purpose of our study is to establish that status inconsistency matters for multiunit organizations. Moreover, we focus exclusively on how external audiences respond to status inconsistency and not on how internal audiences, such as the departments themselves or the business school leadership, respond. We can think of a number of different types of responses, ranging from interdepartmental power struggles to leadershipmandated closing-down of low-status departments, that would merit attention in future research. Despite the aforementioned limitations, our study documents the importance of status inconsistency for multi-unit organizations and draws attention to status inconsistency as an important constraint on selfperpetuating status advantages and an important constraint on horizontal diversification.
